Australiaisfrequentlyhitbybushfires.In2009,the''BlackSaturday''fireskilled173peopleand burnthectaresofbush.Asaresult,aresearchcommissionwascreatedtoinvestigate,andconcluded thatseveralaspectscouldbeimproved,inparticularbetterunderstandingofthepopulationactual behaviour,andbettercommunicationwiththem.Theauthorsarguethatagent-basedmodellingand simulationisagreatapproachtoprovidetoolstoimprovemutualunderstanding:letmanagerstest communicationstrategies,andletresidentsunderstandthemanagers'perspective.Concretely,they extendedanexistingsimulatorwithatheoretically-groundedcommunicationmodelbasedinsocial sciences;theyaddeduserinteractivitywiththemodelandinvestigatedgamificationtoturnitinto aseriousgametoinvolvethegeneralpublic.Theauthorspresenttheresultsoffirstexperiments withdifferentcommunicationstrategies,providingvaluableinsightforbettercommunicationwith thepopulationduringsuchevents.Finally,theydiscussfutureextensionsandgeneralisationofthis simulator.
INTRoDUCTIoN
Nowadays,thenumberofcrisiseventsiscontinuouslyincreasing,betheynaturaldisasters(fires, floods,earthquakes,tsunamis,etc.)orman-madeevents(industrialaccidents,terrorism,refugees flow,etc.)(Guha-Sapiretal.,n.d.).
Inthispaper,weareinterestedinthebushfiresthatstrikethestateofVictoriainAustraliaevery summer, burning many hectares of forest, causing numerous deaths and injuries, and destroying property.Therehasbeena40%increaseinthenumberofbushfiresperweekinAustraliaover5 years(from3284perweekin2007to4595eventsperweekin2013) (Dutta,Das,&Aryal,2016) . Thecurrentstatepolicyis"Prepare,stayanddefend,orleaveearly."Thus,thepopulationisgivena choicebetween:evacuatingearly,beforefirereachestheirareaofresidencebecause"manypeople havediedtryingtoleaveatthelastminute" (CountryFireAuthority,2014) ;orstayanddefendtheir house,whichisfeasibleonlyifapersonisverywellpreparedbothphysicallyandmentally.Inboth cases,thedecisionmustbemadeandaplanpreparedwellinadvance.However,inthesummerof 2009,seriousbushfiresdevastatedapartofVictoria,culminatingontheBlackSaturday7 th February when173peopledieddespitealleffortsatraisingawareness.Thecostofthesebushfireswasestimated tobe4.4billionAustraliandollars,98932hectaresofVictorianparksweredamaged,andaroundone millionanimalsdiedwithadevastatingimpactonagricultureduetolossofcattleandpastures,etc.
Severalreportshavetriedtoexplainthereasonsforthisheavydeathtoll (Teague,McLeod,& Pascoe,2009a; McLennan&Elliott,2011) .Thesereportsidentifiedthreemaininconsistencies:first, inbehaviourinthatthepopulationdidnotreactasexpectedbythedecision-makers;secondlyin informationcontentsincethepopulationdidnotalwaysconsideredtheinformationtheyreceivedto berelevanttothem;andlastlyincommunicationmeans,whichwasfelttobeinefficient,especially inthecaseofinformationbroadcast.
Societiescanmanagesuchcrisisandemergencysituationsinseveralways:adopturbanand territory planning policies to reduce the risks (e.g. forbid construction in exposed areas); raise awarenessandpreparethepopulationinadvance;orcreateefficientemergencymanagementpolicies todealwithcriseswhentheyhappen.Inthisperspective,computermodellingandsimulationisa powerfultooltotesttheeffectsandcomplexinteractionsofthesedifferentstrategieswithoutwaiting foranactualcrisistohappen.Humanlivesneednotbeputatriskandthecostofexperimenting withdifferentstrategiesisgreatlyreduced.Furthermore,itoffersagreatdegreeofcontrolonall conditionsandthepossibilityofreproducingexactlythesamesituationasmanytimesasneededat nocost.Whenmodellinghumanbehaviour,mathematical,equation-basedmodelsaretoolimited (Parunak,Savit,&Riolo,1998) .Onthecontrary,agent-basedmodels,whereautonomousentities (agents)interactingwitheachotherrepresentthehumansinvolved,offermanybenefits (Bonabeau, 2002) . They allow capturing emergent phenomena that characterise such complex systems; they provideanintuitiveandrealisticdescriptionoftheirbehaviour;theyareflexible,offeringdifferent levelsofabstractionbyvaryingthecomplexityofagents.
Asaresult,manypreviousworkshaveusedagent-basedmodellingandsimulationtostudyhuman behaviourinnaturaldisastersandprovidetoolsforemergencymanagers.Inparticular,Adametal. (Adam&Gaudou,2016)havedesignedamodelofthebehaviouroftheAustralianpopulationin bushfiresfrominterviewsgatheredafterthe2009"BlackSaturday"firesbytheVictorianBushfires Research Commission (Teague, McLeod, & Pascoe, 2009b) . This model aims to explain the inconsistenciesobservedinbehaviour,intermsofagapbetweenobjectiveandsubjectiveevaluations ofbothriskandindividualcapabilitiestodealwithit.Theirevaluationprovesthatthemodelprovides goodexplanationfortheinconsistenciesinbehaviournotedinthereport.However,theagentsintheir modelonlyrepresentthepopulation,andtheydonotcommunicatewitheachother;asaresult,this modelisunabletotacklethecommunicationproblemsalsonotedinthereport.
Ourhypothesisisthatthesecommunicationissuesareasideeffectofthissamemisunderstanding betweenresidentsandauthorities,wherethecontentandtypeofmessagessentarechosenbased on erroneous assumptions about the population's expectations. This is consistent with Rhodes' conclusion,statingthat"agenciesneedtochangefromanexpertauthoritativeapproachtoonethat seekstounderstandcommunityneedsandexpectations" (Rhodes,2014 Concretely,wewanttoturnAdam&Gaudou'smodelintoaninteractivesimulationwherethe usercantestdifferentcommunicationstrategies(changingthesource,media,contentorrecipientof messages)andobtainindicatorsoftheirrelativesuccessondifferentprofilesofresidents.Forsuch aninteractivesimulationtolayvalidresults,itisimportantthattheunderlyinghumanbehaviour modelbeasrealisticaspossible (vanRuijven,2011) .Theunderlyingagent-basedmodelwasproven valid(Adam&Gaudou,2016)andsuccessfullycomparedwithanothermorecomplexmodel (Adam, Taillandier,&Dugdale,2017) .Hereweenrichitwithacommunicationmodelinordertoallowthe agentstoreceivemessagesandtoreasonontheircontentandsender.Toensurethevalidityofthese additions,ourcommunicationmodelisgroundedintheoriesfromsocialsciencesthathavestudied communicationissuesforalongtime.Itsoutputisalsocomparedwiththepopulationinterviews performedafterthe2009bushfires.
Thepaperisstructuredasfollows:wefirstquicklydescribetheexistingsimulatorthatservesas thebasisforourown.Thenextsectionintroducesourcommunication-orientedmodelofpopulation behaviour,thedifferenttheoriesthatitisgroundedon:communicationtheory,behaviourchange theory,andcognitivebiasestheory,andhowweimplementedthese.Thefollowingsectionexposes experiments with this interactive simulator used as a decision-support tool for stakeholders, and resultsintermsofcomparisonofvariouscommunicationstrategies.Thepenultimatesectiondiscusses gamificationliterature,anothersuccessfulexampleincrisismanagement,andaspecificationofgaming designelementsthatwillbeaddedtothismodeltoturnitintoaseriousgameforthepopulation. Finally,weconcludethearticlebydiscussingthelimitationsofourapproachanditsfutureprospects.
eXISTING SIMULAToR
Oursimulatorisanextensionofanexistingmodel,designedfromananalysisoftheinterviews, implementedinGAMA,andvalidatedagainstbehaviourstatistics(Adam&Gaudou,2016).Inthis sectionwegiveaquickoverviewofthissimulator. (Grignard.etal.,2013; Drogoul,Grignard,etal.,2013; Drogoul,Amouroux,etal.,2013) isan open-sourceplatformforagent-basedmodellingandsimulation,offeringanintegratedprogramming languageanddevelopmentframeworktodevelopelaboratedmodelswithuptoseveralmillionsof agents.TheGAmaModellingLanguage(GAML)isahigh-levelagent-basedlanguagebasedonJava, specificallydesignedtobeeasytouseevenfornon-computerscientists,allowingdomainexpertsto createandmaintaintheirownmodels.GAMAalsoprovidesnativemanagementofGIS(Geographical Information Systems) data allowing integrating geographical data files into simulations. Finally, GAMAoffersinteractivefunctions(usercommands)enablingtheuseoftheparticipatorydynamics requiredinourinteractivesimulation.
GAMA Platform

GAMA
existing Simulator
AdamandGaudou(Adam&Gaudou,2016)haveimplementedinGAMAanagent-basedsimulatorof thebehaviouroftheAustralianpopulationinbushfires,basedonthepopulationinterviewsgathered after the 2009 fires (Teague et al., 2009b) . In their simulator, the world is a grid of 50*50 cells inhabitedbyfourspeciesofagents:fires,houses,sheltersandresidents(seeascreenshotinFigure1).
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Firesarereactiveagents;theyareinitiallyplacedrandomlyonafreecellandthengrowup randomlyateachcycle,increasingtheirintensity(whichdirectlyincreasesthedamagetheydeal)and size.Peoplecannotgothroughfireswhenescapingbutcancrosstheirareaofeffect(representing thesmokeandheatzonesaroundthefire).Whenallfiresareextinguished,thesimulationstops automatically.
Housesareinhabitedbyexactlyoneresident(nofamilies).Theyoffersomeamountofprotection butresidentscanstillbehurtiffiresarecloseenough.Housescanbereinforcedbytheirownerup toagivenpointwhilefiresarestillfaraway.Whenfiresarecloseenough,theydealdamagetothe houseuntilpossiblydestroyingit.
Sheltersaresafeareaswherepeoplecannotbeharmedbyfires.Residentsknowthelocationof someshelters,andwhenchoosingtoescapetheyaimattheclosestonetheyknow(whichmightnot betheabsoluteclosestoneiftheyignoreitslocation).
Residents Model
Finally, residents are the most complex agents in this simulator. They have various attributes to representtheirhealth,theirmotivations(todefendortoescape),theirriskperception(awarenessof fire,assessmentofdanger),andtheirabilities.Theirpossibleactionsaretopreparetheirhouseand themselves,toescapetowardsashelter,todefendagainstthefire,ortotakecoverintheirhouse.The choiceofactionisdeterminedbyafinitestatemachinearchitecture(seeFigure2):ineachstate,the correspondingactionisperformed,andthetransitionstoanotherstateareconstrainedbythevalues ofattributesandthepositionoffires.
TheinitialstateisUnaware;residentswhoperceiveorareinformedoffiresthenswitchtothe nextstateIndecisive,untiltheymakeadecision.TheFSMthenhas3branches:residentswhoprefer 
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todefendtheirhousemoveontoPreparingdefenseuntilreadyorforcedtomovetoDefending; residentswhoprefertofleemovetoPreparingescapeuntilreadyorforcedtoswitchtoEscapingby proximityofthefire;finally,theotherresidents,motivatedneithertoescapenortodefend,enterthe Passiveshelteringstate.ThisstatecanalsobeenteredfromDefendingorEscapingwhenthesituation makesitimpossibletopursueinthesestates.Pedestriansalsohavetwootherfinalstates,whichcan bereachedfromanyothernonfinalone.ThefirststateisDead,andoccurswhenpeopletookmore damagesfromfiresthantheirresistance.ThesecondisSurvivor,iftheyarestillaliveandoutofa safeareaattheendofthesimulation.
Limitations
Thismodelwasprovenvalidtodescribethepopulation(physical)behaviour,thatistheirdecisions tostayanddefend,orevacuatetowardssafeareas.However,itdoesnotcovercommunicationat all.Alaterversionhascoveredcommunicationinsidethepopulation(Adam&Dugdale,2018),but communicationbetweentheauthoritiesandthepopulationwasnotcovered,whichisessentialifit istobeimproved.Therefore,weintendtoenrichthismodelwithnewfeaturestocoverthisaspect, asdescribedbelow.
CoMMUNICATIoN-oRIeNTeD MoDeL
Thefollowingparagraphsdescribewhyandhowweimprovedthismodelwithcommunicationfeatures.
Importance of Communication in Crisis
Communication is essential during disasters but also very challenging (Manoj & Baker, 2007) due to the information overload and time pressure on deciders. (Palttala et al., 2012) provide an overviewofcommunicationconstraintsduringdisasters,andperformanceindicatorsformeasuring thequalityofdisastercommunicationstrategies. (Ran,2011 )focusesontheimportanceofresilient communicationinfrastructuretoavoidtheirdestructionduringanearthquake;theydonotstudythe contentofcommunication. (Steelman & McCaffrey, 2013 ) study how the theoretical best practices in risk and crisis communicationcanapplyinpracticetocommunicationbeforeandduringwildfiresin3statesofthe U.S.A.Ourapproachisslightlydifferentinthatweaimtoprovideatooltoletstakeholdersexplore communicationstrategies,understandtheirimpactonthe(simulated)population,andimprovetheir communicationasaresult.Webelievethatmutualunderstandingismoreimportantthanblindly followingtheoreticalbestpractices.Thissectionexplainshowweusesociologicalandpsychological theoriesaboutcommunicationtodesignamodelofhowthepopulationreactstomessages,tobe usedinoursimulator.
Communication Strategies
Communication Theories for Crisis Management
In his well-known Communication Theory, Shannon (Shannon, 1948) devised a model of communication with the following components: information source, transmitter (encoder), transmissionchannel,receiver(decoder),destination,andmessage.
Hereweareconcernedwithofficialmessages,whosesourcearethefireauthoritiesincharge ofdealingwiththecrisis,andwhosedestination(ortarget)isthepopulation,eitherasawhole,in subgroups,orindividualpeople.Thechanneltosendthesemessagescanvary,fromdoor-to-door visits,toradioortelevision,orsocialmedia.Thechoiceofachannelhasalreadybeenlargelystudied incrisismanagement.Forinstancesomeworksshowasignificant"channeleffect"ofsocialmedia (Schultz,Utz,&Göritz,˝2011; Utz,Schultz,&Glocka,2013) ,wherethesamemessagehasadifferent effectdependingonwhichchannelitisdeliveredon(socialmediavsmoretraditionalchannels).
Regardingthemessageitself,SpeechActsTheory (Searle,1969; Vanderveken,1990 )exhaustively liststhe5typesofmessagesthatcanbecommunicated:assertive(stateafact,provideaninformation), promissive(committoperformanaction),directive(askororderthehearertoperformanaction), expressive(expressanemotion),anddeclarative(formalinstitutionalactionsuchasdeclaringsomeone married,orguilty).Mostrelevantincrisismanagementareassertiveanddirectivespeechacts.Indeed, ouranalysisoftheinterviewshasshownthatmostmessagesreceivedbythepopulationwereeither recommendationaboutwhattodo(directivespeechacts)orinformationabouttheprogressionofthe fire(assertivespeechacts).Inourmodelwehavethereforelimitedtheavailablemessagestothese twotypes,butmoremessagescanbeaddedinthefuture.
Implementation of Communication Strategies
Basedonthecommunicationtheoriespresentedabove,weimplementedseveraltypesofcommunication strategies,whichconcernthedifferentcomponentsofamessage,namelythechoiceofitssource (authorities,firesoldiers,generalmedia...),itscontent(information,recommendations),anditstarget (allthepopulation,aprecisegeographicarea,oraspecificcategoryofresidents):
• Content-based strategies:Focusedonwhatisconcretelytoldtoresidents. 
Behaviour Change
The goal of the communication strategies described above is ultimately to get the population to changetheirbehaviourduringadisaster,towardswhattheemergencymanagersconsidertobethe bestresponse(evacuatetoasafeareaafteranearthquake,stayconfinedinsideduringachemical incident,etc.).Butthepractitionersadmittedlydonotunderstandwhythepopulationdoes(ordoes not)adapttheirbehaviouraccordingly (Rhodes,2014) .Inordertohelpthemgainunderstandingin thatmatter,wegroundedourmodelofthepopulationreactiontomessagesonpsychologicalliterature aboutbehaviourchange,asdetailedbelow.
Listening Process and Possible Failures
(DeVito,2000)hasdividedthelisteningprocessinto5sequentialphasesthatoccurafteractually hearingthemessage:receiving(orattending,i.e.actuallyfocusingonthemessage),understanding (gettingthemeaningofthemessage),remembering,evaluating(forminganopinionaboutthevalidity ofthemessage),andresponding(i.e.providefeedbackregardingacceptanceofthemessage).Thisfinal stagecanbeintheformofdirectfeedback,orjustbychangingbehaviourasaresultofthemessage.
Communicationcanfailatanystageofthisprocess.Themessagemightnotbeheardifthe recipientisnotmonitoringthechannel(TVorradioisoff).Evenifthemessageisheard,itmight notbeattendedtoorrememberedifthehearerisoverwhelmedbyreceivingtoomuchinformation atthesametime(informationoverload);thehearermightmissrelevantdatathatisdrownedintoo manyirrelevantmessages,whichmightleadthemtostoplisteningtoagivenemitterbecausethey cannotdeal (Austin,Pinkleton,&Fujioka,1999) .Ifattendedto,themessagemightbeevaluatedas irrelevantorinaccurateanddiscarded.Finally,evenifthemessageisconsideredaccurate,itmight notleadtotheexpectedbehaviourchange.
Inparticular,trustinthesourceofthemessageisimportanttoevaluateitsaccuracyandwhether toactuponit.ThreemainfactorsoftrusthavebeendiscussedintheElaborationLikelihoodModel: expertise,trustworthiness,andattractiveness(Petty&Cacioppo,1986).
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Psychology of Behaviour Change
Behaviourchangehasbeenextensivelystudied(see (Prager,2012) Aswecansee,peripheralprocessingismorelikelytohappenduringdisastersduetothestress and time pressure. However, it leads to less lasting attitude changes and is less likely to trigger behaviourchange.Thisisalsoinagreementwith (Kahneman&Egan,2011) .Crisiscommunication shouldthereforebeadaptedsoastofavourcentralprocessing,bysendingonlyclearandrelevant informationthatthereceiversaremorelikelytounderstandandaccept.
Implementing Residents Behaviour Change
Inordertoobtainarealisticmodelofresidentsandoftheirhandlingofmessages,weimplemented severalpsychologicalphenomenabasedonthetheoriesexposedabove:
• Trust in message source:Trustisoneofthemostintuitiveaspectsinvolvedincommunication.
If the source of the message is not trusted, the receiver is not likely to take its content into account.Inourmodel,residentshavea"trustprobability"attribute:itisatablematchingeach sourcewithaprobabilitytotrustthemessagesitsends:thisrepresentsthesource'sexpertiseand trustworthinessdescribedinELM.Thevaluesinthetrusttabledependontheresident'sprofile. Forexample,candodefendershaveahighertrustinlocalsourcesofinformationthanThreat monitors,butalowertrustinfiremen.Fornow,wedidnotimplementsourceattractiveness, whichisalsoafactoroftrustinELM,asitdoesnotseemveryrelevanttoevaluatetrustinofficial sourcesincaseofadisaster; • Message acceptance: In order to represent the information overload phenomenon reported inELM,weaddedanacceptanceprobabilityforeachsourceinthepedestrianattributes,with 87 initial values based on the resident's trust in each source. Then, when a resident receives a message,theymightacceptorrejectitbasedontheiracceptanceprobabilityforitssource;they alsosubsequentlyupdatetheiracceptanceaccordingtothemessageaccuracyanditsperceived relevance.Thus,ifthemessageisperceivedasinaccurate(tooglobalorimprecise)oruseless,the resident'sacceptanceprobabilityforthissourcewilldecrease;onthecontraryrelevantmessages willincreasethisacceptanceprobability.
Cognitive Biases
Thetheoriesdiscussedaboveandimplementedinourmodelprovidetheagentswitharatherrational behaviour,wherecognitiveevaluationofthesourceandcontentofthemessagemightleadtotrust andacceptance,andeventuallybehaviourchange.However,humanbehaviourisrarelypurelyrational (Kahneman&Egan,2011),andevenmoresoincrisissituationssuchasbushfires (Rhodes,2014) . 
Cognitive Biases Theories
Cognitive Biases Implementation
Weimplementedanumberofthesecognitivebiasesinourmodel.Forinstance,theconfirmation biasandanchoringeffectareimplementedbythefactthattheresident'smotivationinfluencestheir riskassessmentandviceversa:aresidentmotivatedtodefendwillunderestimaterisk(anddiscard cuesofahigherrisk),andlowestimationofriskwillincreasetheirdefensemotivation(defense becomesananchor).Thesunk-costfallacyisimplementedthankstothefeedbackfromactions:the defensemotivationgraduallyincreaseswithsuccessfuldefenseactions,makingithardertogiveup defense.Theplanningfallacycomesfromtheagent'soverestimationoftheirability:theymightstart preparingtheirhome,believingtheyareskilledenoughtodosointime,butthefiremightcomeearlier thanexpected;indeed,objectiveskillsaffecttheirpreparationtime.Finally,thebandwagoneffectis accountedforbythesubjectiveevaluationofdanger,whichtakesintoaccountthebehaviourofothers aroundself,andmightleadtounderestimatingdangerifothersdonotevacuate.Thereisnodirect communicationbetweenresidentshoweverinthecurrentmodel,onlyobservationoftheirbehaviour.
Summary and evaluation of the Model
OurmodelofthepopulationbehaviourinreactiontomessagesisanextensionoftheFinite-State Machine model initially designed by (Adam & Gaudou, 2016) . We implemented concepts from varioussociologicalandpsychologicaltheoriesinordertotakecommunicationbetweenauthorities andpopulationintoaccount.Communicationinsidethepopulationisnotimplementedhere,butis dealtwithinotherwork(Adam&Dugdale,2018).
Inordertovalidatethistheoretically-groundedmodel,weransimulationswiththecommunication strategies reported (and criticised) in the residents' interviews (concretely: broadcast of general information) and found that the generated behaviour of the population was consistent with that describedintheinterviews.Indeed,theymostlydiscardedmessagesandadopteda'waitandsee' attitude, unless they were already highly motivated either to stay or to defend. This means that thegeneralbroadcastinformativemessageshadlittleimpactonbehaviourchange.Moredetailed experimentsaredescribedinthefollowingsection.
eXPeRIMeNTS AND ReSULTS
Thissectionpresentsourfirstexperimentswiththismodel.Ourgoalhereistoshowthatbyusingour simulator,someonecangaininsightaboutrelativeeffectivenessofdifferentcommunicationstrategies ondifferentpeople.Belowwedefinedifferentprofilesofresidents(whowillhavedifferentreactions tomessages);wethendescribethescenariosthatwetested,aswellastheindicatorsusedtomeasure successofthecomparedstrategies;wefinallydiscussourfirstresults. (Rhodes,2014) 
Profiles of Behaviour in the Population
Behaviour Profiles
Distribution of Profiles
However, (Rhodes, 2014) provides no information about the distribution of these profiles in the population,andstatesthattheyarenotlinkedwithdemographicfeatures.Intheirsimulator, (Adam &Gaudou,2016) haveshownthatthedistributionoftheseprofilesisindeeddynamic,anddiffers basedontheseriousnessofthefires.Theydidnotimplementtheprofiles,butmeasuredbehavioural features in order to dynamically categorise agents in the different profiles. We adopt a different approachhere,wherewedoactuallyimplementagentswithdifferentpre-setprofilesofbehaviour, inordertobeabletocomparetheimpactofthecommunicationstrategiesonthesedifferentprofiles. Ourgoalistoallowtargetingstrategytowardstheprofileofthereceiver,basedonRhodes'findings.
Implementation of Profiles of Behaviour
Weimplementedthedifferentprofilesofbehaviourintermsofrangesofvaluesoftheirattributes,and modifiedtransitionsinthefinite-statemachine.Forinstance,livelihooddefenderscannotescapebut aremorelikelytoshelterifneeded;theyalsohaveahighabilitytofightfireandahightrustinlocal sources.Thetypeofpopulationcanbeselectedasasimulationparameter.Agentsaretheninitialised withrandomvaluesoftheirattributesselectedinthepre-setrangedeterminedbytheirprofile.
GAMA experiments
Experiments
GAMAallows2typesofexperiments:
• Graphical experiments:Runonesimulationandobservethebehaviouroftheagents"live"to haveaquickoverviewoftheirreactiontovariousstrategies(seescreenshotonFigure2); • Batch experiments: Automatically run many iterations of each simulation (with the same parameters).InthatcasethereisnographicaldisplaybutGAMAoutputgraphsoftheaverage values (over all iterations) of selected indicators, which is a standard technique that allows smoothingouttherandomnessofthesimulation.
Scenarios
Basedonouranalysisoftheinterviews,andonthetheoriesmodelledinoursimulator,wehave designed4scenariosthatallowcomparingthedifferentdimensionsofcommunication. Scenario0isourbaseline:wecomparedthevaluesofallindicatorsonthetwopopulationswithout anycommunication.Thisisusedforasensitivityanalysispurpose:wecheckedthatthedifferent profilesshoweddifferentbehaviourintheabsenceofcommunication,andthatcommunicationdid havetheexpectedimpactonthem.
Scenarios1and2isolateandanalysethedifferentdimensionsofmessages.Thefirstdimension isthecontentofmessages,whichweremainlyinformativeduringthe2009bushfiresaccordingto theinterviews;thepopulationregrettednotgettingmorerecommendations,sowecomparedthese2 optionsinscenario1.Theseconddimensionisthetargetofmessages,andspecificallytheaccuracyof thistarget.Accordingtotheinterviews,residentsmainlyreceivedgenericbroadcastmessages,while theyexpectedsomethingmorepersonalised;so,wecomparedvariouslevelsofaccuracy(broadcast vsgeographical-targetedvsplan-targeted)inscenario2.
Scenario3isabitdifferent.Inanattempttoprovetheusefulnessofoursimulator,weexploredthe impactofshelter-basedstrategies,notreportedintheinterviews,toshowwhatinsightcanbegained.
Compared Profiles
Oursimulatoraimsatshowinghowunderstandingthepopulationcanimprovecommunicationtothem. Wethereforecomparedtheimpactofcommunicationstrategiesondifferentprofilesofresidents.The 90 goalistoshowthatdifferentprofileswillreactdifferentlytothesamemessage,whichsupportsthe requirementformorepersonalisedcommunicationtohavemoreimpactonthepopulation.
Concretely,wehaverunexperimentstocomparethestrategiesaboveon2profilesofpopulation outofthe7listedbyRhodes,namelythecan-dodefenders(planningtodefendtheirpropertyand skilledtodoso)andthethreatavoiders(planningtoescapefires).Indeed,thesearethetwoextremes inthescaleofprofiles,whichmakesthedifferencesmostvisible.Weexpecttheotherprofilesto fall somewhere in between these two markers in terms of communication needs. More detailed experimentscanbeperformedinfutureworktofurtherinvestigatetheseprecisedifferences,butthe pointofthecurrentpaperisjusttoprovethatourtoolallowstoshowandexplainsuchdifferences.
Indicators
Tobeabletocomparethedifferentstrategies,wedefinedandimplementedthefollowingindicators measuringtheirrelativesuccessorfailure:numberofdeaths;numberofinjuries;totaldamageto houses;totalcostofcommunicationactions.
Settings
Foreachscenario(comparingseveralsimulations),weran60iterationsof200cyclesofeachsimulation (whichrepresentsover3hoursofsimulatedtimewithoneminutelongcycles).Betweenthecompared simulations,weonlyvariedthecommunicationstrategytested,withtheotherparametersbeingexactly thesame(numberandstrengthoffires,population,availabilityofcommunicationchannels,etc.).
Output
Theoutputofourbatchexperimentsconsistsingraphsshowingthecomparativeaveragevaluesof theseindicatorsfordifferentstrategiesoverthe60runs.Averagingvaluesisastandardtechniqueto smoothouttheinherentrandomnessofthemodel(initiallocationoffires,propagation,initialfeatures ofindividualresidents,etc.).Itisthereforethemostrelevantstatisticalvalue.Thegraphsobtained forthescenariosdefinedabovearediscussedbelow.
Scenario 0: No Communication
Wefirstcomparedtheimpactoffiresonthetwopopulationswhennocommunicationactionsare performed.Withthethreatavoiders,populationisfocusedonlyonescape,andsincewedidnot implementfiremeninoursimulation,weexpectedthefirestogrowoutofcontrolandleadtoahigh numberofvictimsandgreatamountofdamage.Therewasindeedahugegap(intermsofdamages, injuriesanddeaths)comparedtothecan-dodefenderspopulation,asshowninFigure3.
The next scenarios compare the impact of various communication strategies on these two populations.
Scenario 1: Comparing Information vs. Recommendation Messages
Can-Do Defenders
Asexpectedwithsuchskilleddefenders,valuesofbuildingdamage,injuriesanddeathsarequite low. As shown on Figure 4 , there are no big differences between broadcasting fire information andrecommendationsintermsofdamageorcost.Thereareslightlymoreinjuredanddeadwith recommendationsonly.Ourdataallowsexplainingthisobservation:intheabsenceofinformation messages,manyresidentsremainunawareofthefires(toofartobeperceiveddirectly)sotheydo notfeelconcernedandignorerecommendations.Asaresult,theydonotprepareandendupbeing morevulnerablewhenthefirearrives.Sincelesspeopledefend,thefiregrowsfasterandlaterblocks orinjuresescapers.Onthecontrarywithinformationonly,residentsareawareofallfiresevenfar away,whichincreasestheirsubjectiveriskperceptionandinturninfluencestheirbehaviour:more 91 peopleescapeearlyandstaysafe.Thedifferencebetweenthetwostrategiesremainssmallbecause can-dodefendersrelymainlyonthemselvesratherthantheauthorities,sotheyarelesslikelyto acceptthemessagesanyway.
Threat Avoiders
Thedifferencebetweeninformationandrecommendationsismuchmorevisibleonthreatavoiders sincetheyaremorelikelytoacceptmessages(Figure5).Withtheinformationmessages,thereare moreescapersandlessdefendersbecauseofdangerperceptiondistortion(knowingmorefiresleadsto overestimatingdanger),andthereforemoredamagetobuildings.Furthermore,threatavoidershavea lowercapabilitythancan-dodefenders,theirescapewillbelessefficientsotheyaremorelikelytoget hurt,leadingtomoreinjuries.Recommendationsarethereforemoreefficientthangenericinformation. 
Scenario 2: Accuracy of Messages
Can-Do Defenders
Threat Avoiders
Not surprisingly, the most efficient strategies are the same as for Can-do defenders (targeted communicationisbetterthanbroadcast),eventhoughthevaluesoftheindicators(damage,injuries) aremuchhigherhere(seeFigure7).Thisisbecausethreatavoidersaremorelikelytoacceptand reacttothemessagesevenwhennotdirectlyconcerned(firestoofar),andmorelikelytooverestimate 
Scenario 3: Shelter Communication
Thegoalherewastocomparetheefficiencyoftwooppositestrategies:buildingmoresheltersbut withoutinformingpeopleaboutthem,orrelyingonlyafewsheltersbutadvertisingalotaboutthem. Bothstrategiesaimatmakingsurethatallresidentsknowwheretoescapeifneeded.
Can-Do Defenders
Weobservednorealdifferencebetweenthese2oppositestrategiesoncan-dodefenders(seeFigure 8).Communicationisonlyslightlybetterbutmuchlesscostlythanbuildingnewshelters.Thisisnot reallysurprising.Can-dodefendersareskilledandexperiencedandthereforeknowthepositionof thesheltersalready(evenifthereareonlyfewofthem)andcanreachthemeasily.Moreover,most ofthemdecidetostayandfightagainstfiresanyway,makingshelter-basedstrategiesirrelevantto them.Finally,withmoredefenders,thereislesscongestionontheroadstothesheltersandthefire doesnotpropagatesofast,sotheescapersaremorelikelytoreachthesheltersuninjured.
Threat Avoiders
Shelter-basedstrategieshaveamuchmoredifferentiatedimpactonthreatavoiders(seeFigure9). Thefirstthingwecannoticeisthedifferenceintermsofsafepeople.Threatavoidershavelower abilitiestoreacttofires,andmaynotknowthepositionofsheltersornotbeabletoquicklyreach them.Whenbuildingmoresheltersratherthanadvertisingthem,someresidentsdonotknowanysafe areaandjustrunrandomlytoavoidfires,leadingtomoreinjuriesandlesssafelyshelteredpeople. Thelongerthesimulationtime,thebiggerthefiregrows,andthemorerandomlyrunningpeopleget trapped.However,thedamageisslightlylowerinthatcaseassomeresidents,notknowingwhereto go,endupshelteringintheirownhouseanddefendingit.Advertisingtheexistingsheltersreduces thetimespentonroadslookingforone,andthereforethenumberofinjuriesincurredbyescapers. 
Personalisation to the Profiles
Asexpected,communicationshouldbepersonalisedtothedifferentprofilesfoundinthepopulation (oratleasttobroadercategoriesofdefendersvs.escapers),inordertoprovideeachresidentwith informationthatisrelevantandhelpfultothemwithoutdrowningitinaflowofirrelevantmessages.
Ourresultsshowthatthebestcommunicationstrategytowardscan-dodefendersistoinform themaboutfiresintheirgeographicalarea.Itsdownsideisitshighcost(thesmallereachtargetarea, themoredifferentmessagesneedtobeelaboratedandsent),sotargetingresidentsbasedontheir declaredplansmayalsobeagoodandlesscostlyalternative.Messagesaboutsafeareasaresecondary forintendeddefendersandshouldbeusedparsimoniously.
Accurategeographicaltargetingisalsobetterforavoiders(eventhoughmorecostly),butcontrary todefendersrecommendationsaremoreusefulforthemthanbareinformation,astheyarenotskilled enoughtointerpretthelatter.Moreover,earlyinformationaboutsheltersisusefultoraiseawareness ofescapepossibilitiesandtriggerearlierevacuation,thusreducinginjuriesincurredwhileescaping.
Plan-Based Targeting
Fortheplan-basedbroadcaststrategy,weassumedthatresidentshadpreviouslydeclaredtheirfire plan(intentiontodefendortoleave)tothefireauthorities.Thisisnotthecaseinreality(inthese scarcelypopulatedareas,thefirebrigadesmighthavesomeinformationbutnotnecessarilyabout everybody);however,experimentingwiththisstrategyallowsustoshowwhatcouldbedoneifthe populationwasaskedfortheirfireplaninadvanceandthereforestillprovidesvaluableinsight.
Besides,italsoshowstheinterestofindirectcommunication:globalauthoritiesmightnotknow eachresident'sfireplanwhenbroadcastingmessages,butlocalmanagersmightdo.Theycouldact asafilterbetweenthelarge-scalebroadcastingandtheirlocalresidents,receivingallmessagesand onlyforwardingthemostadaptedonesforeachresident.Ofcourse,thisisalsoacostlystrategy,but automationcouldbeinvestigated. 
More experiments Needed
A big limitation of our experiments is that they are all performed on a homogeneously profiled populationinordertodrawrelevantresultsforthatpopulation.However,inreality,thepopulationis heterogeneouswithresidentsofall6profileslistedabove,andacontinuousrangeofmotivationsand abilities.Strategiesareyettobetestedonapopulationwitharealisticdistributionoftheseprofiles, butwefirstneedtoobtaindataaboutwhatthisdistributionisintheactualpopulation.
We also tested all strategies independently, while in reality emergency managers may use a combination or sequence of several strategies, for instance broadcasting information and recommendationsatthesametime.Moreexperimentsareyettobeconductedwithmorerealistic combinedstrategies,possiblyincooperationwithemergencymanagers.
Finally, our experiments were quite short: 200 cycles of simulation means about 3 hours of simulatedtime.Inrealitythesefirescanlastfordays.Longer-termcommunicationstrategiesthus needtobetestedaswell,toensureresidentsstayoutofaffectedareas,respectpossibleroadblocks,etc.
Simplification
A model always ought to be a simplified version of reality. There are however a number of improvementsthatcouldbemadeinfutureworktoimprovetherealismofoursimulation.Ofcourse, therandomfiremodelisthefirstthingthatcomestomind;itshouldbereplacedwitharealistic modeloffiretakingphysicalandmeteorologicalparametersintoaccount(windstrengthanddirection, rain,temperature,etc.)whencomputingpropagationandgrowth.Suchmodelsalreadyexist (Miller, Hilton,Sullivan,&Prakash,2015) .
Ofmoreinteresttousaretheagentsinvolvedinthesimulation.Sofarweonlymodelledresidents asautonomousagents,andemergencymanagersare"played"bytheuserbutcanonlysendmessages. Itwouldbeveryinterestingnowtoalsomodelfiremenandtheirdifferentactionsonthefield,from fightingthefiretocommunicatingwiththepopulationandhelpingthem.Theonlypresenceoffiremen alsohasagreatpsychologicalimpactonresidents(Kinatederetal.,2014),whichshouldbemodelled.
Goal of This Simulator
However,weremindthatourgoalinthispaperisnottodeterminewhichstrategyis''optimal'',butto provideatooltoimprovemutualunderstanding.Sofarwehavelookedatimprovingthestakeholders' understandingofthepopulation.Forthisunderstandingtobemutual,wewillnowlookatimproving thepopulation'sunderstandingofthechallengesfacedbythestakeholders.Inordertoinvolvethe generalpublicintoourtool,wehavestudiedhowtoturnitintoaseriousgame.
TowARDS A SeRIoUS GAMe
Accordingto (Roberts&Lajtha,2002) ,"…thekeytoeffectivecrisismanagementliesnotsomuch withthewritingofdetailedmanuals(thathavealowlikelihoodofbeingused)andpracticinglocation evacuations,aswithstructuredandcontinuouslearningprocessesdesignedtoequipkeymanagers with the capabilities, flexibility and confidence to deal with sudden and unexpected events…" Asdiscussedabove,seriousgamesdoofferbenefitsforcrisismanagement,andinparticularthis possibilityofcontinuouslearningbyengagingthelearnerinaplayfulyetseriousprocessaimedat lettingthemexploreanddiscoverbestpracticesandstrategies.Therehavethereforebeenmanyworks touseseriousgamesinthefieldofcrisismanagement(see (DiLoreto,Mora,&Divitini,2012) for asurvey),inparticularregardingcommunicationtraining (Haferkampetal.,2011) .
In this article so far we have developed a realistic simulation of the population, including psychologicalaspectsoftheirbehaviour,andinteractiveuseractionssimulatingvariouscommunicative actions.Thissimulationisaimedatprovidingprofessionalswithadecision-supporttoolforimproving 97 communicationstrategiesduringbushfires;itisinteractive,butitishoweverstillfarfromaserious gameabletoengagethegeneralpublicandraisetheirawareness.
Inthesectionbelow:wefirstdiscusstheuseofinteractivesimulationforraisingawareness;we thensurveysomerelevantliteratureaboutuserengagementandmotivation,andaboutgamification andhowitcancreatethisengagement;wethendescribeasuccessfulexampleofturninganagentbasedsimulationintoaseriousgame;andwefinallydiscussthestepsneededtoturnthecurrent simulationintoaproperseriousgame.
Participatory and Interactive Simulation for Raising Awareness
Computersimulationisagreattoolforcrisismanagement (Urban&Oulehlová,2017; Dugdaleet al.,2010; Radiantietal,2015; Kleiboer,1997 ),whichoffersmanybenefits.Comparedtofull-scale simulationexercises,itismuchlesscostly,lessdangerous,andeasiertoorganise.Yetitstillallows discoveringknowledgebyexploringseveral"what-if"scenariosbeforeanactualcrisishappens,with completecontrolonallparameters.Participatorysimulationisatypeofsimulationwherehuman usersinteractwiththesimulatedworldbycontrollingsomeoftheagentsinthesystem.Participatory simulationisthereforeatypeofseriousgames,i.e.gamesthatareusednotforentertainmentbutfor learning,training,orunderstandingmechanisms(Michael&Chen,2006 .
Serious games have several benefits over more classical approaches to teaching or raising awareness.Theyfollowaconstructivistlogicinwhichtheplayersbuildtheirownknowledgeby confrontingaprobleminasimulatedworld.Ameta-analysisgathering193articlesaboutserious games (Sauve,Renaud,&Gauvin,2007) hasshownmanybenefitssuchas:favouringthedevelopment ofsocialandhumanrelationshipsandcommunicationskills;increasinglearningmotivation,selfesteemandself-confidence,engagementandpersistence;developingproblem-solvingskills;helping learnerstostructure,buildandrepresentknowledge;andhelpinglearnerstointegrateinformationby developingthecapabilitytobuildlinksandtransferknowledgefromothercontexts.
Interactivesimulationsandsimulation-basedseriousgamesareparticularlyinterestingforraising awarenessofvarioustypesofrisks (Benjamins&Rothkrantz,2007; Crovatoetal.,2016) .Bybeing placedinariskysituationandallowedtotryseveralwaysofmanagingit,theplayerscanbetter comprehendtherisksandtheirpossibilityofoccurrence,butalsotheconsequencesoftheiractions oftheserisks.Formajorriskssuchasbushfires,exploringdifferentstrategiesandtheirimpactina seriousgameprovidesplayerswithsomeexperience,simulatedbutclosetothereal-worldmechanics. Suchexperiencewouldbehardtoacquirefromrealcrisisinsuchashorttime,duetothelongduration betweenevents(severalmonthstoyears),andthestakesinvolvedthatpreventfromtryingblindly.An importantaspectofseriousgamesandparticipatorysimulationsistorelyonapedagogicalscenario integratedinthegamedesigntoansweraspecificpedagogicalobjective (Chadli,2015) .Moreover,a numberofwell-specifiedrulesmustguidetheplayer'sexperiencebyspecifyingobjectives,conditions ofvictoryorfailure,possibleinteractionswiththegameandtheotherplayers(ifany),andmechanisms fortheevolutionofthegameworld.Theserulescanbeintegratedinthecomputermodel,provided externally(e.g.notecardtobereferredtowhenneeded),orboth.
User engagement and Motivation
Twoformsofmotivationareusuallyopposedasthetwoextremesofacontinuum (Vallerand,1993) : intrinsicmotivation(internalmotivationtodosomethingbecauseofitspleasantnessorsubjective importance or significance) and extrinsic motivation (external factors or rewards pushing to do something,e.g.togainmoney).Intrinsicmotivationhoweverismorelikelytoleadtolong-term engagement.Intheparagraphsbelowwedescribemodelsofthesetwonotions:Karasek'smodelof engagement,andMarczewski'sRAMPmodelofintrinsicmotivation. (Brandtzaeg,Folstad,&Heim,2006 )studied"funology",i.e.enjoymentinhuman-computer interaction,byusingKarasek'smodelofengagementandwell-beingatwork.Theyfoundthatthe samethreefactorsinfluencedengagementinbothcomputergamesandwork: 99
Conclusion
Toconclude,whatwewillcallgamificationhereistheuseofgamedesignelementsinordertoturn ourinteractivesimulationintoamoreengagingandplayfulexperience.Inthenextparagraphwe furtherillustratethisprocessbydescribingasuccessfulexampleofturninganagent-basedsimulation intoaseriousgame.
A Successful example
Taillandieretal. (Adam,Taillandier,Delay,Plattard,&Toumi,2016) haveproposedanagent-based simulation for raising awareness about coastal flood risk on the Oleron Island, which they later turnedintoaseriousgamenowusedforteachingriskmanagementattheUniversityofBordeaux (Taillandier&Adam,2017 
Results
Finally,weranbatchexperimentstohighlighttheprosandconsofdifferentpossiblestrategieson differentprofilesofresidents,anddeducedsomeusefulinsightforemergencymanagers.Thesefirst experimentsweremainlyintendedasaproofofconceptofoursimulationasadecision-supporttoolfor managers:theyshowthatitallowsvisualisingimpactofdifferentstrategiesondifferentpopulations.In thefuturewewillimplementmorecomplexstrategiestoallowmorevariedexperimentations:choiceof channel,temporalcompositionofmessages,indirectcommunicationthroughlocalrepresentative,etc.
Future work
Inparticular,weintendtodedicatesomefutureworktothefollowingaspects.First,wewillmodel amorerealisticpopulation,withaheterogeneousdistributionofthedifferentprofiles,andalsowith socialrelationshipsandattachmentbetweentheagents (Bañgate,Dugdale,Adam,&Beck,2017) . Second,wewillgodeeperintheformalisationofcognitivebiases(Arnaudetal.,2017);herewe focusedonlyonafewofthemthataffectmessagehandling,butmanyothersplayaroleindisaster reactions;otherinterestingpsychologicalfactorsatplayinsuchsituationsincludeemotions.Also, wewanttomoredeeplystudytrust(inthesourceandchannel),itsimpactonbehaviourchange,and itsdynamic.Finally,thecommunicationmodelcouldalsobeenriched;inparticularwewanttoadd morepossiblemessagetypesandcontents:promissivesandexpressivesmightberelevant,forinstance expressingfearaboutthesituation,orpromisingthatthefiresareundercontrol;FIPA-likemessages havebeenusedinotherworkssuchas(Mancheva&Dugdale,2016),whomodelledcommunication insideamedicalteam.
Generalisation
Since our model is grounded on theoretical literature about communication, it is not specific to bushfiresandcanbeextendedinthefuturetoothertypesofdisasters.Whatwillneedtobeadapted isonlythedomain-specificcontentofthemessages.Thegeneralstructureofthegamewillhowever remainthesame.Thiscouldbeveryinterestingtostudysimilaritiesanddifferencesincommunication duringdifferenttypesofdisasters.
Serious Game
Finally,asdiscussedextensivelyabove,weintendtogamifythissimulation,i.e.toturnitintoaserious gamethatwillfosterengagementofitsusers.Startingfromthespecificationofgamingelements performedinthispaper,wewillincrementallyimplementsuchelements,andvalidatetheireffects ontheusers.Itisimportanttonoticethatsuchworkisgenericandcanbeappliedtodifferenttypes ofdisasters,asshownbytheSPRITEseriousgameforraisingawarenessaboutcoastalfloodsrisk (Adametal.,2016).Webelievethatagent-basedmodellingandsimulationisagreattooltoraise awarenessandpreparecrisismanagementplansforanytypesofcrisis,betheynaturaldisastersor man-madeevents.
